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abstract: This article deals with the human will and the individual 
character and their relevance in the moral sphere. After introducing 
the conative domain, it argues for the need to have a psychological and 
educational model of human character. The paper presents Espinalt’s 
(1920-1993) concepts of will and character and their consequences for 
education. After having explored human will and understanding the causes 
for the relative lack of consideration of will by modern psychology, a 
definition of character is presented as a result of exercising human will. 
Three different dimensions of character are considered: One more connected 
with instincts, another with culture, and the most distinctive of individual 
self-engraving. The third dimension leads to different considerations of 
education that are briefly explained. The Espinaltian vision is contrasted 
with other contemporary visions of human will and character. The social 
and historical forces with an influence on the education of the character 
are also considered. Finally the paper argues for the centrality of these 
approaches for a moral education which is based on Aristotelian views. 
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INtRoductIoN
the neoclassical model of the human psyche
Traditionally the human psyche has been divided into three components: 
Cognition, affect and conation (Hilgard, 1980; Tallon, 1997). Mayer 
(2001) explained how this triune vision dates from the 18th century and, 
for that reason, it is referred to by some authors as the neoclassical model 
of the human psyche (Diessner, Frost & Smith, 2004), and identified as 
a framework embedded in the visions and researches carried out in an 
important part of modern psychology. Cognition refers to the process 
of getting to know and understand; of encoding, perceiving, storing, 
processing, and retrieving information; affect refers to the emotional 
interpretation of perceptions, information, or knowledge; and conation 
refers to the connection of knowledge and affect to behavior, it is the 
personal, intentional, deliberate, goal-oriented, or striving component of 
motivation, the proactive (as opposed to reactive or habitual) aspect of 
behavior (Huitt & Cain, 2005). Connation is the mental process that 
activates and/or directs behavior and action. Various terms used to represent 
some aspect of conation include intrinsic motivation, goal-orientation, 
volition, will, self-direction, and self-regulation.
Considering these three dimensions separately, we can observe that 
cognition has received an important part of the attention from modern 
psychology and has been considered crucial to prepare children and youth 
for adulthood through thinking skills and critical thinking (Gallifa, Pérez 
& Rovira, 2002; Huitt & Cain, 2005), but the awareness that cognition 
is not the whole story, even in understanding intellectual functioning and 
development, has been growing (Dai & Sternberg, 2004). On the other 
hand, emotions have an important tradition in psychology, although 
sometimes have been seen by the western mind as disruptive for the 
conscious mind. Damasio (1994) called this phenomenon the Descartes’ 
error related to -attributed to Descartes-dualism, which separates the 
res cogitans and the res extensa giving centrality to the cogito, more 
identified with cognition. The field of neuroscience has, after a long period 
of looking at the other way, again embraced emotion as an important 
research area (LeDoux, 2000) and the development of constructs and 
research on emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Mayer & Salovey, 
1997) have strongly focused attention of contemporary psychology on the 
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affective domain. At the beginning of modern psychology, conation was 
considered central to its study; however interest in conation has declined. 
Many contemporary researchers believe volition, defined as the use of will, 
or the freedom to make choices about what to do, is an essential element 
of voluntary human behavior and human behavior cannot be explained 
fully without it (Huitt & Cain, 2005). Some authors propose and work 
in views that integrate the three dimensions (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; 
Dai & Sternberg, 2004; Diessner et al., 2004). In practice, it is not easy 
to separate these dimensions and, for example, the concept of emotional 
intelligence in Goleman’s (1995) formulation clearly includes cognitive, 
affective and conative dimensions. Another example can be measurement: 
Some perspectives find fundamental commonalities among particular 
measures of cognition, affect, and conation (Ackerman & Beier, 2003). 
understanding the conative domain
We argued that the conative domain is constituted by complex processes 
that can receive different names like motivation, goal-orientation, volition, 
will, self-direction or self-regulation. These processes are not exactly the 
same in terms of their biological basis or level of consciousness implied . 
Some are more related with cognition, others with affects, but all require 
some level of motives and very often conation is referred to as motivation 
(Dai & Sternberg, 2004). 
Motivation can be understood as a biologically driven system, responsible 
for inward bodily monitoring that indicates important biologic needs and 
urges: The body's need for food into hunger, the need for water into 
thirst, and the need for self-defense into urges for safety or attack (Mayer, 
2001). Some better knowledge on the functioning of the limbic system 
can help to understand the mechanisms of motivation that are central in 
neuroscience. Major motivation concepts that have historic importance 
or have influenced the interpretation of behavioral neuroscience research 
are: Homeostasis, setpoints and settling points, intervening variables, 
hydraulic drives, drive reduction, appetitive and consummatory behavior, 
opponent processes, hedonic reactions, incentive motivation, drive centers, 
dedicated drive neurons (and drive neuropeptides and receptors), neural 
hierarchies, and new concepts from affective neuroscience such as allostasis, 
cognitive incentives, and reward liking versus wanting (Berridge, 2004). 
The study of emotional brain and fear mechanisms may also contribute 
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to understanding the neural circuits of motivation (LeDoux, 2000).
In a more psychological level, one way of defining conation is to 
describe a taxonomy of the conative domain. Atman (1987) proposed 
five conative stages: 
1. Perception: Openness to multiple forms of sensory and intuitive 
stimuli. It is important at this stage for the individual to be able to perceive 
relationships and flow among phenomena. 
2. Focus: the ability to distinguish a particular stimulus or pattern 
from the background. This is the stage at which the individual establishes 
a goal or desired end result. 
3. Engagement: the individual begins to more closely examine the goal 
and its features, beginning to develop an action plan as to how the goal 
can be accomplished. 
4. Involvement: the individual begins to implement the action plan. 
Depending upon the level of attention shown in each of the previous 
stages, this involvement can range from minimal to absorbed. 
5. Transcendence: the individual is completely immersed in the task 
in such a manner that the mind/body/task become one. A variety 
of researchers such as Maslow, Assagioli, and Csikszentmihaly have 
described this stage as peak experience; joyous, transpersonal will; and 
flow, respectively (Huitt & Cain, 2005). 
Another way of studying conation is to describe the processes of conation 
as an approach to the classic definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
in light of contemporary research and theory. Intrinsic motivation (Deci, 
1973) remains an important construct, reflecting the natural human 
propensity to learn and assimilate; and extrinsic motivation can vary 
considerably in its relative autonomy and thus can either reflect external 
control or true self-regulation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). A major benefit 
of this approach is to distinguish internal from external motivation, 
again as a guide to facilitate the development of competencies necessary 
to successfully develop conation. From this perspective there are three 
aspects of conation or volition (Huitt & Cain, 2005): 
Directing: Defining one’s purpose; identifying human needs; having 
aspirations, visions, and dreams of one’s possible futures; making choices 
and setting goals; developing an action plan.
125gIméNez-camINs & gaLLIFa
esPINaLt’s coNcePt oF humaN WILL aNd chaRacteR
Energizing: Overcoming inertia; high self-esteem; physical fitness, high 
physical energy; attention focusing; positive self-talk; ability to manage 
emotions (arouse and dampen); getting started, initiating task; positive 
social interactions with family and friends.
Persevering: Engaging in daily self-renewal activities; monitoring 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors; self-evaluation using data collected in 
the monitoring process; reflection on progress; completing tasks.
Another approach to motivation or volition is the relationship with 
personality (Maslow, 1970). After reviewing the research in the domain of 
personality traits, Huitt (Huitt & Cain, 2005) identified 4 conative styles: 
Fact Finder: Gathers data and probes for more information; most 
oriented to activities that encompass defining, calculating, formalizing, 
and researching.
Follow Thru: Seeks patterns for known information; most oriented 
to such acts as arranging, coordinating, integrating, and implementing.
Quick Start: Seeks to be creative and innovate; most oriented to 
activities that involve brainstorming, intuiting, inventing, and risk taking.
Implementer: Desires to demonstrate knowledge and skills: “most 
oriented to such acts as building, crafting, forming, and repairing.” 
In very important fields of applied research, motivation has been a 
useful construct: In commitment in relationships (Arriaga & Agnew, 2001) 
or in employees’ commitment (Myer, Becker & Vandenberghe, 2004); 
in brand loyalty (Alwi, 2006; McMullan & Gilmore, 2003); students’ 
motivations (Pintrich, 2004; Weiner, 1990). These few examples illustrate 
the importance of the field of motivation and volition. 
relevance of the will in the moral sphere
Without the purpose of going in depth in the contemporary debates 
on moral theories, we'll point out the renewed interest in virtues by 
some authors that had revived virtue ethics as a modern evolution of 
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Aristotelian views. For Aristotle human eudaimonia, happiness, consists in 
the exercise of the virtues. The central theme of this vision is that human 
nature is perfected through virtue. Much of Nicomachean Ethics is taken 
up with portraits of the virtuous individual intended to attract one to a 
life such as his. For Aristotle, all of the practical virtues will be possessed 
by the truly virtuous person, the individual of practical wisdom. The 
Aristotelian view of ethics is that 
far for being based on general abstract principles that can at one and 
the same time be universal, invariable, and known with certainty (he 
argued), ethics deals with a multitude of particular concrete situations, 
which are themselves so variable that they resist all attempts to 
generalize about them in universal terms. In short, Aristotle declared, 
ethics is not, and cannot be a science. Instead, it is a field of experience 
that calls for a recognition of significant particulars and for informed 
prudence: for what he called phronesis or “practical wisdom” (Jonsen 
& Toulmin, 1990, 19). 
Virtue theory is a general area of philosophical inquiry concerned 
with or related to the virtues. It includes virtue ethics, a theory about 
how we should act or live. 
It is worth noting that there is a difference between acting virtuously 
and doing a virtuous action. One’s doing a virtuous action may be seen 
as doing the action a virtuous person would do in those circumstances, 
though one may not oneself be a virtuous person. Virtue ethics, then, 
concerns itself not only with isolated actions but with the character 
of the agent. There are reasons for doing certain things (such as kind 
things), and also for being a certain type of person (a kind person)
(Crisp, 1998).
Crisp (1998) explained how virtue ethics is usually seen as an alternative 
to utilitarianism or consequentialism in general: Utilitarianism says that 
we should maximize human welfare or utility. A utilitarian, however, 
may advocate acting virtuously for reasons of utility. For Crisp ethical 
theories are best understood in terms not of what acts they require, but 
of the reasons offered for acting in whatever way is in fact required. This 
account of virtue ethics enables Crisp (1998) to distinguish it from its 
other main opponent, deontology or Kantianism. A Kantian, for example, 
might claim that my reason for telling the truth is that to do so would 
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be in accordance with the categorical imperative. That is a property 
of the action of telling the truth quite different from its being honest. 
Much of virtue theory has been concerned to develop Williams’ criticism 
of utilitarianism and Kantianism that through their impersonality and 
impartiality, utilitarianism and Kantianism violate the integrity of moral 
agents (Crisp, 1998). Foot (1978) developed these critical arguments in 
a direction favorable to virtue ethics. According to both the principle 
of utility and the Kantian categorical imperative, moral reasons, being 
universal, are independent of the desires of agents. Foot (1978), impressed 
by the rationality of fulfilling one’s own desires, argued that moral reasons 
do depend on the desires of the agent. Modern virtue ethicists can thus 
adopt a position on the demandingness of morality between the extremes 
of Aristotle and their modern opponents. For they need claim neither 
that self-interest is constituted entirely by being moral nor that morality 
completely overrides self-interest (Crisp, 1998).
McDowell (1979) argued that we cannot postulate a world as seen 
by both the virtuous and the unvirtuous, and then explain the moral 
agency of the virtuous through their possessing some special desire. Since 
moral rules run out, any object of desire could not be made explicit. This 
has clear implications for moral education: it should consist in enabling 
the person to see sensitively, not only in inculcating rigid and absolute 
principles (Crisp, 1998). This is one of the strands in the feminist critique 
of modern ethical theory, itself closely tied to virtue theory. Gilligan 
(1982) argued that the moral sensibility of women is less rule-governed 
than that of men, and this influenced the ethics of care, for example.
a problem for moral education
Because the will and the character are relevant for morality, at least in 
the Aristotelian or virtue ethic traditions, a clear problem comes up for 
moral education: There is a need to bear in mind the conative domain and 
having both a psychological theory on character and suitable models for 
character education. Without models for character education is difficult 
building a moral education in these traditions. The present paper aims 
to introduce an author who gives centrality to the will and character and 
points out to the importance of their deliberate education. This author is 
Carles M. Espinalt (1920-1993). Presenting some of his main ideas we’ll 
try to make know the relevance of his approach for moral education. 
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We are not supposing that these ideas are the only ones interesting for 
character and moral education. We don’t want to write the last word about 
the topic, but for the clarity of concepts and for the in depth analysis we 
are convinced that Espinalt’s approaches can contribute to make sense to 
some educational needs. After presenting the theoretical approach we'll 
illustrate with a concrete example how these ideas can work in the day 
to day of the educational situations. 
esPINaLt’s vIeW oF humaN WILL 
Carles M. Espinalt was born in Montesquiu near Barcelona in Catalonia 
(Spain) in 1920. After graduating, he joined the army at the front in the 
Spanish civil war (1936-39). This experience marked his life decisively. He 
lived near death and tried to understand what could motivate the behaviors 
he saw under war: Aggression, violence, heroism,.., and also how people 
reacted under war circumstances. In 1950, he founded Barcelona’s school 
of Graphology. He replaced Max Pulver in the Psychometric Department 
of Nestlé and Sandoz in Barcelona. In 1953, Espinalt published some 
books: One of them, Del poble català (Of Catalan people), was published 
under the pseudonym Pere E. Bauló, due to the prosecution of ideas 
and of Catalan manifestations ruling in Spain at that historical period. 
With this book he became well-known in other countries, especially in 
France. In 1960, he promoted the manifesto Per la llengua catalana (For 
Catalan language), signed by one hundred people. The manifesto claimed 
for Catalan language to be used in schools again, withdrawing its current 
prohibition. This manifesto was very influential, and it started the public 
struggle to recover Catalan language. With the book Modelar-se la figura 
(Shaping the figure), he initiated his theories on the balance and mutual 
influences between the individual’s external aspect and character. In 1971, 
he created what he called Psycho-aesthetics (Giménez-Camins & Gallifa, 
2010). His books were translated to different languages, and he was a 
prestigious lecturer (outside the Academy, because at that time in Spain 
universities were still ideologically controlled by the regime). Espinalt was 
counselor of democratic politicians that in time became influent. He was 
vice-president of the National Catalan Council, and was committed to 
the cause of Catalonia, sometimes refusing political responsibilities due 
to his loyalty to his ideals and to maintain his freedom of thought. He 
died in 1993.
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Espinalt (1966) stated that human will is a conscious impulse that 
prevails over other inclinations of the temperament, opposing a system 
of brakes to each one, elaborated by the intellect and affect that have 
at the same time the power to remove obstacles and resistances. Will 
is reflective wishing that presses over unconscious forces and over the 
obstacles coming from the environment. It can easily be converted into 
a moral or perverse vector of our acting. It manages a flow of urges or 
lets the person drown in them if they make no use of will to materialize 
the conscious dictates (Espinalt, 1966). The internal unconscious forces 
are instincts and habits; the external forces are environmental forces and 
social habits. Will starts in childhood as the instinct of hunger. Due to 
this origin, a person that has not evolved from this stage, when having 
to do a task, is not guided by determination, but by having or not ganas 
(lit. hunger in most Latin languages) to do it (Espinalt, 1966).
To understand the functioning of will, Espinalt (1966) proposed that 
will is organized in three phases: Purpose, planning, and duty. Purpose 
in itself is not enough, because programming and overcoming instincts 
or habits that lead to more suited or passive alternative actions is needed. 
Will also generates the condition of duty, that is, to force oneself, thus 
ordering human consciousness through an act of the will.
People with firm will that have exercised this factor have a characteristic 
behavior: They are used to being self-confident in that they can obtain 
what they want; they stare out steadily, without blinking pointlessly; 
they do not put off until tomorrow what could be done today, they like 
acting with efficacy; when they want to, they can change their moods; 
they can refrain from things that they like very much if they know that 
they are against their interests; they do not believe that their future way 
of earning their living is written in advance. Knowing how to act gives 
them confidence (Espinalt, 1966). Whoever has firm will also has a high 
degree of organization and discipline. Will is not totally innate it can and 
must be trained with education (Espinalt, 1970). Otherwise the people 
without firm will cannot overcome the uncontrolled drives of their 
instincts. Some dialectic between the pleasant satisfaction of the immediate 
urge and the long term purpose that will proposes is confronted by the 
individual in a varied range of situations. Furthermore, without will 
there is no freedom. When somebody wants to dominate human beings 
in the social or political arena will is attacked, not intelligence or affect. 
The human being is dominated by weakening his will and is liberated by 
reinforcing his will (Espinalt, 1992b).
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reasons for the lack of interest in the conative domain
As the human will is so important, what is the reason for the apparent 
lack of consideration it is given in comparison to the intellectual or affective 
domains? Espinalt (1992b) explained how will fell into disrepute in the 
last century due to different ideological trends that distorted its meaning: 
Freud, for example, created a similar concept of will with the concept 
of super-ego. Freud’s concept of super-ego proposes that, as children are 
subdued to their parents and forced to obey them, the ego is subdued 
to the categorical imperative of the super-ego (Giménez, 2008). For 
Espinalt, a genius like Freud did not understand what will represents for 
human beings and its description as a repressive factor helped to create 
a deep dislike against will (Espinalt, 1992b). These theories generated 
psychological tendencies and social movements that postulated a criticism 
towards any kind of organized behavior that could restrict the confidence 
of the ego. For Espinalt, will has to be repressive because it has a double 
projection: Outwards, for the impulse of the ego and for the decision 
of achieving; and inwards, to have a control of our ego’s habits and our 
instincts (Espinalt, 1992b). Will is a heritage of the western world, from 
Greece to today, and without the Roman Empire will would not exist 
as we know it; on the other hand the 20th century was characterized 
by the systematic destruction of human will that took 2,500 years to be 
developed (Espinalt, 1992b). 
A factor that can be easily mistaken for will is instinct. This confusion 
has also led to the disrepute of will, and it can be historically dated: 
A lot of writings have explained the consequences of Nazism, among 
them the outbreak of the Second World War, but for Espinalt (Giménez, 
2008) the confusion of Nazism between human will and the power of 
survival and destruction instincts has not attracted enough attention. Espinalt 
explains how Goebbels and Rosenberg, who was the philosopher of Nazism 
with the book The Myth of the Twentieth Century, one of the books that 
the Nazis read, promoted this confusion. When someone asked Hitler’s 
opinion about Rosenberg’s book, Hitler answered: “I have only read a 
small part, because it is a difficult book to understand”. Espinalt (Giménez, 
2008) ironically says that Hitler was doing an intelligence test with this 
answer, because he showed that he was not able to understand his own 
philosophy. The issue is that Nazis found Rosenberg too intellectual because 
he talked about the importance of human will, but it was unnecessary to 
be so smart. Goebbels knew that men could be dominated in a simpler and 
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more comfortable way, because he discovered that men could be moved 
only through survival and destruction instincts. Why should they make 
the effort of structuring will if promoting the destruction instinct, for 
example, of the police, explaining how to torture people’s spirit, increasing 
their survival instinct and making them obey their orders they would 
obtain the desired results more easily? Fromm in Escape from Freedom 
(1941) devoted a chapter to the psychology of Nazism, where he showed 
the manipulation of concepts that were the result of these fateful writings 
by Goebbels: The aim of education was to teach submission to individuals 
not to make their personality stronger. Already from childhood, at schools 
individuals had to learn to be submissive, not only when they were fairly 
punished, but they even had to learn to take injustices in silence. They 
wanted to make their people believe that personal will does not count, that 
it is only the power of the strong against the weak that can be preserved 
to survive, while behind this proposal, human individuality was smashed 
to bits, dissolved into a superior power that destroyed the volitional force. 
This is a cruel form of slavery and domination in a very confusing way 
because it was presented as if it was the human will! Will was never dealt 
with or understood. But this confusion gave the world, and particularly 
the USA, the false idea that obsessive will is a hateful thing, because they 
thought that Nazis tried to dominate everything with an excess of will, 
when Nazis actually did nothing else but using vilely the human beings’ 
survival and destruction instincts (Giménez, 2008). This confusion (will-
instinct) has been another of the historical reasons, from the Espinaltian 
perspective, of the particular disrepute of will to our days.
The other historical motivation for the disrepute of human will comes 
from Soviet Russia. Lenin talked about free will as a shameful myth. He 
did not believe in individual will, because his thought was that everything 
was conditioned to the determination of the historic materialistic laws. 
For example, in the textbooks of the Faculty of Psychology, the starting 
point for the maximum development of the Soviet man was to reduce 
his individual will and subordinate it to the requirements of social duty. 
Free will could not exist, and the Psychology books at Moscow university 
explained that man should raise some aims and try to achieve them, and 
at this point will had to intervene. The point is how will is interpreted: 
Espinalt (Giménez, 2008) presents a text of Moscow university entitled 
The Psychological Content of Voluntary Acts where “personal will is the 
activity directed by the consciousness of social duty, by the social need”. 
Here the individual subordinates all his acts to social requirements. That 
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means that everybody had to channel his will for the common good. 
This attitude reminds one of a flock of sheep rather than that of a free 
individual (Espinalt, 1963). 
These are the two dramas from the point of view of will: Nazism and 
Communism. This made the consideration of human will historically 
difficult (Espinalt, 1992b). When there is a lack of individual will, moral 
character or moral ethics are not possible. Without will, there are no 
ethical shades of meaning. Any person deprived of his will is vulnerable, 
is or can become corrupt. Due to this, it is difficult to stop corruption, 
because there is so little basis of will (Espinalt, 1992b). 
toWaRds a deFINItIoN oF chaRacteR: esPINaLt’s vIeW 
A direct consequence of this lack of consideration of the importance of 
will, or confusion of what human will really is, is the misunderstanding 
of what individual character is and what the importance and meaning of 
character education is. These issues have crucial consequences in education.
The word character comes from the Greek word charaxo that means 
to engrave, with reference to behaviors deeply engraved or embedded in 
the psyche, in form of habits or attitudes literally engraved in our minds 
(Naranjo, 1994). These character-driven behaviors are difficult to change 
because of inertia and homeostasis. Overcoming them is not easy but with 
purpose and energy new behaviors can arise. For Espinalt (1963), character 
is the ways of living acquired by the individual through the action of his 
will and the force, hostile or favorable, of the environment. Rationality 
is necessary because character needs some kind of deliberative action. 
Character directs, controls, and modulates our temperament in front of 
internal or external stimuli. Character is manifested through attitudes of 
the ego in the face of life events. We say in Latin languages that a person 
has no character if they take no attitudes, if they are doubtful in front 
of the facts.
Character should not be mistaken for temperament. For Espinalt, 
temperament unites human beings to physiological determinism (Giménez, 
2008). If only temperament existed, no free acts would be possible. 
Character is superimposed over temperament. On the other hand, character 
should not be mistaken for personality or the traits of our way of being, 
either. There are individuals with great personality, due to their feelings 
or intelligence, but with absence of character, in spite of their singularity 
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they do not find the right moment to make decisions (Espinalt, 1963). 
Character requires will and is part of conscious life (Espinalt, 1992b).
But because of the already explained situation concerning the lack of 
consideration of the importance of human will, this Espinaltian concept of 
character has had no pre-eminence. Instead of it, other visions of human 
character have been more influential:
Some authors define and study character as a set of non-intellectual 
components. The concept is wide and it includes temperament, affective 
traits, habits, etc. This temperamental way of understanding character can 
be understood as a first dimension of it. The central point in this dimension 
is understanding character as a psychological notion that refers to all the 
habitual ways of feeling and reacting that distinguish one individual from 
another (Freud, 1957), partly to inherited dispositions, and partly to the 
effect of environment, under which a particular significance is ascribed to 
up-bringing (Abraham, 1925). The concept of neurosis is related to this 
view of character (Naranjo, 1994). This view praises the unconscious, 
temperamental-based or personality like view of character. The engraving 
of character is related to instinctive repression or neurotic strategies that 
compete with instincts (Naranjo, 1994). 
A second way to understand character is related to the capacity of the 
environment to influence attitudes, habits, values, etc. For this vision, 
character is usually moral character (Kohlberg, 1964; Narvaez & Lapsley, 
2005; Piaget, 1965) or national character -shared perceptions about the 
personality characteristics of the typical member of their own culture and 
of typical members of other cultures (McCrae & Terracciano, 2006). 
Differences between cultures are studied (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004) and 
these kinds of studies raised for example some doubts about the reality 
of the stereotypes (McCrae, 2001; Terracciano et al., 2005). Another 
form of studying this concept is through character education understood 
as socialization (Althof & Berkowitz, 2006; Berkowitz & Bier, 2004; 
Lickona, 1993; Lickona, 1996). Davies pointed at some problems in the 
interpretation of character education as citizenship (Davies, Gorard & 
McGuinn, 2005). The engraving here is from the outside and what is 
engraved is the super-ego. This is also consistent with the former view. 
This second dimension of character can be called moral-cultural dimension 
of personality.
Espinalt explains how, due to the strong influence of psychoanalysis on 
our society, some educational principles emerged that were not good for 
character development. Freud’s genius was to find out that men are not 
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rational beings par excellence, even though they boast of it, but instincts 
turn human beings into irrationally guided beings. Freud detected the 
causes, but did not fully reach the adequate remedies (Espinalt, 1961). 
For Freud and psychoanalysis, education is viewed as an oppressive 
external factor that represents the demands of civilization. In accordance 
with psychoanalysis, civilization has been conquered by renouncing to 
the satisfaction of instincts and forces that each individual follows. Freud 
tended to believe that super ego with his norms inhibited the normal 
evolution of instincts. That was the origin of neurosis and unhappiness. 
Freeing unconscious tendencies that tried to emerge or acting without 
repressions would be the way towards avoiding psychological tensions 
and psychopathological deviations. Freud, on the other hand as a man 
of great character, projected with force his theories on libido to oppose 
magic trends of his time. In a conversation with Jung, he said: “It is 
necessary to set my sexual theory as a norm since it is the only defense of 
reason against the possible irruption of the wave of the occult” (cited by 
Espinalt, 1990). But Freud could not imagine that his efforts to focus on 
the unconscious would give, as a result, a reinforcement of the instinctive 
part over the conscious one. Humanity had taken a step but this was 
not enough. Little by little, an idea emerged that nobody could be happy 
unless connected with their instinctive roots and living according to the 
dictates of their inner life. The Hippie movement of the sixties was, for 
Espinalt, the culmination of this spirit that was against impositions from a 
society that restricted the individuals’ free expression. There is no reason 
to argue about pacifist and brotherly ideals, but the strategies to achieve 
them caused this movement to launch a new vision of human personality 
that worshipped the instinctive part. Hippies eliminated time, had no 
watches, regulated themselves by instincts (hunger, thirst, sleep), did not 
want to have their freedom restricted by the dictates either of time or 
society, nobody and nothing could organize their lives. Responsibilities 
and obligations were not made for them. They wanted to go back to live 
in the country, they thought that living again as cavemen would make 
them freer from problems. This false idea of freedom, consisting in the 
primacy of instincts, has been influential, even today a lot of young people 
–even well educated– share this view (Espinalt, 1990). 
The identification of ruling dominant passions or neurotic mechanisms 
that compete with instincts as an adapting answer to the lack of love, 
that can be understood in their psycho-dynamics, view that is shared 
with object relations theorists (Naranjo, 1994), in practice leads to the 
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same result identified by Espinalt: Primacy of unconscious mechanisms 
over conscious ones. 
These influences, added to the lack of consideration of human will, 
lead to the situation where the modern man has half the character of that 
of the 19th century man, why? Because modern technologies give him a 
false illusion of character (Espinalt, 1986).
Character has, for Espinalt, a necessary third dimension, because 
character gives the possibility of changing and overcoming capacities that we 
lack by nature. If character did not exist, we would have an unchangeable 
personality. Some people show this thought by saying “I am like that”, 
and this is a factor that may incapacitate to understand the transforming 
function of character in personality. Dweck et al. (1995) studied how 
people’s implicit theories about human attributes structure the conditions 
by which they understand and react to human actions and outcomes. She 
reviewed research showing that when people believe that attributes (such 
as intelligence or moral character) are fixed, trait-like entities (an entity 
theory), they tend to understand outcomes and actions in terms of these 
fixed traits (“I failed the test because I am dumb” or “He stole the bread 
because he is dishonest”). In contrast, when people believe that attributes 
are more dynamic, malleable, and developable (an incremental theory), 
they tend to focus less on broad traits and, instead, tend to understand 
outcomes and actions in terms of more specific behavioral or psychological 
mediators (“I failed the test because of my lack of effort or poor strategy” 
or “He stole the bread because he was desperate”). The two frameworks 
also appear to foster different reactions: Helpless versus mastery-oriented 
responses to personal setbacks and an emphasis on retribution versus 
education or rehabilitation for transgressions (Dweck, et al., 1995). 
The dimension of incremental theories introduces the individual to the 
possibility of change.
Character development needs intelligence, emotions and will. Primitive 
human beings had to develop characterial forces to overcome their 
condition and constructed a more complex environment compared to 
other species (Espinalt, 1963). In front of the passive dimensions of 
character together with temperament or personality, the more affective, 
or culturally or educationally conditioned, more intellectual passive, 
character has the possibility to be constructed by the action of human 
will on personality. This is an active exercising of will. Because of the 
aforementioned misunderstanding of will in contemporary times, this 
explains the lack of consideration of individual-personal character in our 
RamoN LLuLL JouRNaL oF aPPLIed ethIcs 2011.  Issue 2136
times in comparison with other historical times. Will needs purpose and 
energy directed to fulfill it. In terms of oneself, exercising will means 
personal purpose to achieve and practicing these new traits. This is a 
personal motivated engraving.
Using this third dimension, character is to make decisions, keep them, and 
change them whenever appropriate. Character is not only good intentions 
or subjectivities, but facts and determination. In two words: steadying 
oneself (Espinalt, 1963). This requires being in shape. As muscles need to 
be trained, character ought to be trained. Character is like a true helm that 
guides and regulates human actions under intelligence. When we find an 
individual that does not know what path to take, hesitant, indecisive or, 
as a weathervane, praises where the wind is blowing, we say that this is 
an individual without character, but in the same statement we understand 
that he is a being undermined by lack of security (Espinalt, 1961).
Adler believed that we are decision-making beings responsible for our 
own behavior and capable of changing it (Adler, 1931; Adler & Brett, 
1998). This third view, which consists in self-engraving, in having an 
intentional, proactive and determined concern in one’s development, 
requires training. Two different worlds are possible: reactive, easy-going, 
instinctive-neurotic driven, or intentional, proactive, and self-engraved 
by character.
Character, on the other hand, could not be mistaken for bad humor. 
In Latin languages we have the sense of character as in strong character 
meaning a tempered or nervous person. Self-affirmation is not to be 
necessarily equivalent to neurotic nature. In Latin languages, a person that 
has strong and violent reactions is referred to as having character. This 
led to mistaking character for insensitivity, egoism or lack of concern for 
others. Enforcing respect for rights should not be mistaken for the bad 
character of one who does not tolerate the opinions and rights of others 
(Espinalt, 1961). In a world where the logic of adaptation to the masses is 
more and more present, character imprints personal and differentiated traits 
to the individual. While temperament or socialization makes individuals 
uniform and is stereotyping, only character personalizes and individualizes, 
it makes them singular and unique human beings (Giménez, 2008).
 To summarize the perspective presented: We have three dimensions of 
character, one constructed on top of the next. The first dimension is the 
temperament-personality dimension; the second is the cultural-socialized 
dimension; and the third, and this is the special meaning for Espinalt, the 
self-intentional dimension. In a comparison that can be meaningful, we 
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can compare the temperament-personality dimension with learning the 
process of drawing different letters, the cultural dimension with learning 
the reading-writing process that the former requires, that is, how to read 
and write words and connect them with meaning. In this example, the 
individual dimension of character can be compared with the process of 
writing and composing a complex text. Given the former dimensions, 
personal writing is a singular expression, it involves culture, but goes 
beyond it because there is individual self-expression. Each of these learning 
dimensions are complex processes, and each dimension is necessary for the 
next dimension to appear, but succeeding dimensions do not necessarily 
derive from earlier dimensions. To develop these complex processes, 
exercise and practice are needed. Drawing is closer to biology, words to 
culture, but self-expression is more individual and can be developed or 
not. Similarities with individual character are eloquent.
evolution of individual character
Espinalt explains how the psychoanalytic concept that the decisive time 
to develop character is early childhood needs to be revised. Childhood is 
an important time, but it is not the most significant for Espinalt, because 
the beginning of adolescence and the affective elections that, apart from 
family, are produced are a more determining fact than the experiences of 
diapers or crawling (Espinalt, 1972). Personality is more easily influenced 
in childhood and adolescence. In these periods it is easier to teach positive 
habits, but character can be formed at any age of life and it is never too 
late to create it, as well as to lose it (Espinalt, 1972).
Children, even if they have shown earlier signs of intelligence, do not 
start giving signs of authentic will until the age of four, and then very 
modestly. As Freud said, children are subdued to their parents’ will; 
then their will shall be mastered by the will of the superego in the case 
of forming a will (Espinalt, 1992b).
As muscles have to be exercised, to be in shape, character also has to be 
exercised, because if life is a struggle in any dimension, it is in the constant 
care required to develop character through exercise (Espinalt, 1972). 
Modern and contemporary psychology do not have this direct concept 
of character. Some concepts in recent intelligence research like Emotional 
Intelligence (Goleman, 1995) or Succesful Intelligence (Sternberg, 1999) have 
conative dimensions and characterial traits but without an explicit definition. 
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human types of character
Espinalt made a classification of human characters in four categories 
(Espinalt, 1970): 
The restless: They are individuals with passionate tendencies that are 
happy in whatever is innovative. They are attentive to modernity, sensitive 
to changes. They like living and finding new challenges in life. They are 
adaptable and have few routines. 
The mimetical: People that do not generate enough dynamism for 
self-determination, but they are sensitive to others’ acts. Especially they 
let themselves be led by the passion that they find in the restless, who, 
with their motion and enthusiasm, exert a strong influence on them. They 
are attentive and have a certain level of dynamics, although they are not 
impulsive, and can anticipate change.
The pondering: They are individuals with a personal belief that, in 
front of life, before acting, a lot of precautions have to be taken. To be 
secure, they are irresolute. It is not reasoning or indecision that stops them 
but a matter of slower dynamics and are not as imperious as the restless. 
The pondering need time and stimuli to assimilate changes and to act. 
Fear, “what others may say”, “things have always been like this or that”, 
etc. are common expressions and they lose ascendancy over leadership. 
The outcasts: They are outside social processes, they can have good 
ideas but have no power or strategy to put them into practice. The outcasts 
tend not to get involved. 
History is made by the restless, and the pondering just comment on 
it. Vivacity and vehemence lie with the restless or with the mimetic that 
copy their facts or gestures. The others are spectators (Espinalt, 1970). 
To understand the influence of a person on a group, it also has to be 
understood what level of social evolution the individual is in: initial, 
qualified, power, glory; or what their characteristic personal attitude is 
like: frustrated, conformist, cynical or collaborative (Espinalt, 1970). See 
the figure below for the different possible combinations: 
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Psycho-esthetic study on the

















implications of the formation of character for moral education
After the evaluation of what character is and what the will represents 
in human beings, is interesting deducing what are the consequences of the 
lack of training in these important issues for moral education. 
We explained that character's development requires will and the will is 
always an effort, because it interacts with temperament, i.e. with the instincts 
and habits, and in turn reacts also with the forces of the environment and 
social habits. If the will, as a fundamental part of character, is not well 
formed, the dominating forces are temperamental, that is the most basic 
instincts of the person. Without the will, instincts are seeking immediate 
pleasure, the instantaneous satisfaction of the primary needs. In this case 
the functioning of the personality requires no effort and in any case can 
consider moral principles. On the other hand, will represents the control 
(no repression) of these forces to achieve a more sublime satisfaction, because 
the reward is in the same effort that models us and helps us to refine the 
personality (Giménez, 2008). Willpower also involves a modification of 
the primary negative emotions, either towards oneself or towards others.
Nevertheless the forces of environment and social habits represent 
powerful environmental elements with which the character has to interact. 
If it is weakened, individual will be quickly influenced and will find difficult 
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to keep the moral principles that anticipated. For example if a young man 
knows he can not drink alcohol while driving but people who interacts 
with him don't consider this a significant issue, he must maintain a very 
firm attitude when their fellows incite him to drink or make fun of him. 
Training the will will be possible insofar as education is proposing 
to value the role of effort, mitigating the consequences of a society that 
promotes leisure and the idea that everything should be easy and fun. 
Moral decisions can not be maintained without firmness. The inappropriate 
influence of the environment and the instincts led the person to move 
along the easier path. Without strength of character in situations fraught 
with difficulties integrity can not be maintained.
The consequences of the underestimation of the will can be found today, 
among other symptoms, in the increasing unethical behavior concentrated 
especially in some political class that acts usually as anti-model of respect 
for other persons and views (Giménez, 2008). Without increasing the 
dissemination of positive models in the media and without appropriate 
education of willpower, will be difficult to maintain moral principles or 
virtues. If the purpose of education is to promote individuals who are 
directed to social good or to the personal self-improvement, we can't 
forget that the impulse to achieve it comes from willpower.
Character education acquires new meaning when based on Espinalt’s 
dimensions of character, further away on the concept of education only as 
social adaptation. Influences in childhood are important in the creation of 
character. The incoherence in influences, for example inconsistencies between 
parents and school, creates character disorientation (Espinalt, 1963). The 
most important influences are: family, school, peer group, and media. All 
of them have a powerful influence on childhood education. These mutual 
influences consciously or unconsciously shape character (Espinalt, 1963).
Espinalt is critical of character education at schools: Our schools do not 
educate character, at least to the spirit of our culture and at the level that 
is required in our world (Espinalt, 1963). Despite the intellectual training 
that young people receive, the lack of training to make decisions and 
take on responsibilities generates a lot of anxiety that could be prevented 
with some adequate character education. The requirement of managerial 
capacities of an individual doing a professional career is an example of 
the need to review curricula (Espinalt, 1961). The causes of this situation 
have been analyzed above.
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human models 
One of the most useful tools to enable the willpower, and that has been 
extensively studied for Espinalt is the role of human models. The study and 
analysis of relevant human figures is the main road that leads student to 
realize the importance of effort to achieve the goals that will lead him/her to 
self-improvement, both individually and socially. For example, in this respect 
would be important to ensure that school subjects were studied along with 
the characters that developed these approaches. So mathematics should be 
studied next to individuals that, with particular directed efforts, developed 
these ideas in response to some social or intellectual situations. The human 
qualities are transmitted effectively when we see them embodied in people. 
It's very difficult to inculcate them only in theory. The effectiveness of the 
models is based in the fact that humans can learn from the experiences of 
others (Giménez, 2008). To illustrate this point we can observe how an 
historical figure such as Antoni Gaudi, which was severely criticized when 
he began creating his original architectural works, but he continued his 
work through his strong character that prevented that he felt demoralized 
and influenced by his companions. 
exercises to train character
For Espinalt, human beings need to constantly train and prepare 
character through these different ways:
1. Creation and analysis of models. We learn the use of the will from human 
models. To learn the effort of individuals which created knowledge, 
for example, side by side with the subject is a way to understand will. 
2. Will of communication and overcoming shyness and lack of need to 
communicate the own points. 
3. Bringing the incentives that give meaning to life, the motivations that 
impel the individual to achieve goals in life alive. This mean knowing 
the individual motivations and passions. 
4. Updating personal forms according to the character of times. Each 
time and culture has their particular way of expressing character. 
5. Analysis of the updating. Self analysis of personal traits.
6. Motivating instructions. Short sentences that represent the aims that we 
propose for ourselves and that generate motivation and life. Transforming 
the purposes in short sentences and repeating them.
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some techniques to reinforce or develop character 
Espinalt (1988) presented three kinds of exercises to perfect character:
Figure 2
1. Voice. Recording one’s voice is a technique that helps to identify the 
person with his way of speaking. Many people do not identify their own 
voice or reject it as they find it not very pleasant. Only through identifying 
the sound that we produce when speaking can we develop security and 
dominion of our relationship with others. Our voice, for Espinalt, is 
like some music that we constantly listen to and has subliminal effects 
on our mood. Changing voice tone is a common Espinaltian exercise. 
Having our voice recorded allows us to listen to ourselves, knowing if 
our arguments are adequate, if we have enough vocabulary, if we make 
ourselves understood… 
2. Writing. For Espinalt, writing is the expression of personality. 
Written self-expression is also a way of self-knowledge used by Espinalt.
3. Mirror. Espinalt stated that man’s best friend is not the dog but the 
mirror. Self-observation of our own figure in the mirror and exercising it 
in gestures, in face expressions and look, will be fundamental to reinforce 
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character and have an adequate personal identification. Espinalt explains 
how, for centuries, the reflected images have been interpreted as the 
personal soul. 
Five characteristics favor character training (Giménez, 2008): domination 
of habits, domination of instincts, experiential maturity, will to communicate 
and compensation of the inferiority complex
split of character and personality
The lack of development of character, so characteristic of our society and 
already analyzed, leads Espinalt to describe the split or lack of integration 
between character and personality. This figure illustrates this situation 
(Espinalt, 1992a):
Figure 3
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On the one hand, personality, more unconsciously rooted, and on the 
other hand character, more consciously produced, need to be coherent and 
balanced. When there is some lack in this balance, there is what Espinalt 
called a split between personality and character. 
This situation of split is common today in people that do not have 
their own opinions and believe the last person that tries to convince 
them. The influence of media, especially TV, exacerbates this situation 
(Es pinalt, 1992a).
an example: the loss of the ethic of hard work in education.
We will present a problem of our time, which Espinalt identified, and 
we’re going to explore the consequences of this problem in a relevant 
example for moral education: The ethic of hard work or the problem of 
having lost the work ethic or the satisfaction of a job well done. We’ll 
show why character education (understood as Espinalt does) is a useful 
approach in this so common situation in our time.
According Espinalt the individual who developed character and the 
individual guided by temperament are in two very different positions. 
Because character directs, controls, and modulates temperament, an 
individual guided only by temperament can not resist their immediate 
needs. These immediate needs can come from the unconcious (like instincts, 
complexes or intuitions) or from the environment. These two positions are 
characterized as the full-conscious individual (directed by the character) or 
the mini-conscious one (directed by the temperament) (Espinalt, 1992b). 
Because the mini-consciuos position, according Espinalt, is very common 
in our time there are some consequences easily identifiable. One of these 
consequences is the loss of the ethic of hard work in education. This means 
lack of effort, laziness, unwillingness to take certain works, and lack of 
motivation for a job well done. This loss can be understood as a loss of 
work ethic which may include also being reliable, having initiative or 
maintaining social skills. It is also a loss of the belief in the moral benefit 
of work and its ability to enhance character. The consequence is a lack 
of pleasure in the job well done. An illustrative case on the importance 
of work ethic and job well done can be the Gaudi buildings. Gaudi was 
a genius of the architecture. Nevertheless his works could not had been 
possible without the cooperation of all kinds of very skilled artisans 
(bricklayers, carpenters, glaziers, blacksmiths...). Without the work well 
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done and the Gaudi's culture from this detailed work, his architecture 
wouldn't have been possible. Contemplating a Gaudi's building is an 
evocative form to understand the culture of what effort means, or what 
means the job well done. 
The Espinaltian proposal to cope with this not uncommon situation 
in Education is through educating the will and developing character. This 
education doesn’t imply only to teach moral rules, but the development 
of character. The Espinaltian development of character can be understood, 
as the acquisition of the Aristotelian phronesis or practical wisdom. To 
develop character (the full-conscious person) and to get out of the mini-
conscious position controlled by temperament is an educational version 
to learn virtues, as some virtue ethic theories propose. For this we can 
consider the espinaltian approach as concrete psychological and educative 
models useful for moral education. 
 
coNcLusIoN 
We presented an author, Espinalt, who gave centrality to the human will 
and character, proposing a psychological framework and educational ideas to 
consciously educate character. Is not the only one perspective presented on 
the importance of the conative domain and we presented some other authors 
that pointed out to the same direction, but maybe without the emphasis 
and personal commitment than our introduced author. This personal way 
of explanation and interpretation allows for rethinking the relevance of 
the conative domain. The lacks of consideration of this dimension and the 
historically produced confusions have been presented, together with the 
consequences for the individual. The interpretations of Espinalt include 
some educational perspectives to educate character. Some problems as the 
lack of satisfaction for the job well done, not uncommon at schools, are 
addressed by the espinaltian approach and explained as a concrete example.
The interest of these interpretations is that the espinaltian development 
of character can be understood as a concrete way of developing Aristotelian 
phronesis, in the sense that modern virtue ethic theorists understand 
virtues and their relationship with motivation and personal character. This 
is an alternative to morality understood only as a rule-based thinking. 
The distinction between acting virtuously (being a virtuous person) and 
doing a virtuous action is at the heart of this moral debate. We presented 
diverse positions on moral issues and explored one of the approaches. 
RamoN LLuLL JouRNaL oF aPPLIed ethIcs 2011.  Issue 2146
With psychological and educational models for character education, 
like the introduced here, moral education will enhance by having new 
approaches and concrete models in one of the main traditions which the 
Aristotelian influence represents. 
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